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Turkish sports diplomacy in the service
of renewed power? The uses and limits
of Turkey’s “sport power”
Jean-François Polo
1 For the first time in its fifteen years of brilliant yet unsuccessful candidacies to host the
Olympic  Games  (OG)  and  the  Football  European  Championships  (Euro),  Turkey  was
admitted  into  the  elite  group  of  countries  capable  of  staging  sports  mega-events.
Although it failed in the last round for the 2020 Olympic Games (beaten by Tokyo in 2013),
and for the Euro 2016 (beaten by France in 2010), it has since been tipped as the strong
favourite to host Euro 2024. International matches have been simultaneously utilized by
the Turkish government as an opportunity to publicly demonstrate its  willingness to
resolve historically problematic issues with other countries,  notably Armenia,  Greece,
and Syria. It will be argued that Turkey’s ambitions to host sports mega-events and its
politicization of specific matches (against Syria and Armenia) can be interpreted as a
strategy of the state to diffuse a positive image at home and abroad, and consolidate its
role in the region.
2 This issue aims to assess the applicability of  Nye’s (2004) concept of  soft  power to a
description and explanation of Turkey’s foreign policy and its regional impact in the last
decade. It is tempting to participate in this debate by focusing on the political uses of
sport. Nye’s concept of soft power has been frequently employed in studies seeking to
establish a correlation between the growth of  international  influence and the use of
sports  diplomacy,  including  hosting  sports  mega-events  and  achieving  national
recognition through sporting success.  This  approach raises  the  question of  the  links
between sport and politics, a theme that is as recurrent in common reasoning as it is in
the academic field.1 
3 Before outlining the limitations of Nye’s concept of soft power, the relationship between
sport and politics will  be firstly considered. Although the neutrality of sport is often
claimed by the sporting world (Defrance 2000) through statements asserting its difference
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from politics, numerous potential implications of the impact of sport on political issues
remain  (Polo  2005),  and  particularly  from  an  International  Relations  perspective.
According to Pierre Milza (1984),  the international  significance of  sport  encompasses
three areas: Sport as a part of and reflecting the international stage; sport as a signifier of
public feeling; and sport as a means of foreign policy. It is the latter dimension of sport as
an instrument of foreign policy that requires elaboration in relation to Nye’s concept.
International competitions continue to constitute a quest for the recognition of national
power (Elias and Dunning 1994: 307). Numerous examples across history have illustrated
the  ways  in  which  states  have  striven  to  demonstrate  their  power  through  the
achievement  of  international  sporting  success  (Boniface  2002;  Houlihan  1994).
International  sport is  deeply impregnated with nationalism, which has often reached
spectacular degrees. From Nazi propaganda in the 1936 OG (Brohm 1983) to the Beijing
Games in 2008 (Collectif anti-Jeux olympiques 2008), the consequences of the political
uses  of  sport has  served  at  best  to  boost  national  pride,  and  at  worst  encouraged
nationalism. However, international sport has not only been a means used by states to
show off their power,2 it can also simply be a way of achieving international recognition
of its existence and increasing legitimacy. International sports authorities, such as the
International Olympic Committee (IOC), the Football International Federation Association
(FIFA), and the Union of European Football Association (UEFA), have the capacity to act as
effective parallel channels for international diplomacy. Awarding the organization of an
international sports mega-event to a country, such as the Football World Cup or the OG,
signifies international recognition, the implications of which is amply demonstrated by
the  fierce  competitiveness  of  candidate  countries.  Events  have  been  utilized  by
authoritarian  states  as  a  means  of  legitimizing  their  political  systems,  or  at  least
improving their international appeal, as can be argued in the cases of the Argentinian
FIFA World Cup in 1978 and the Moscow Olympic Games in 1980.  In other contexts,
fulfilment  of  the  bid  criteria  represents  an  implicit  acknowledgement  of  the  high
standard of development attained by a country, such as the OG in Seoul, 1988, Barcelona,
1992,  Athens,  2004,  and  Rio,  2016.  Similarly,  the  political  progress  of  South  Africa’s
peaceful transition from apartheid was translated into recognition by FIFA through its
award of the 2010 World Cup.
4 Studies of sport as a diplomatic tool frequently cite the concept of soft power (Gillon 2011;
Freeman 2012; Champagne 2012; Huish, Carter and Darnell 2013). However, the majority
of the time the assumed relevance of the term is employed without sufficient appraisal of
its practical applicability. References to the definition of soft power developed by Nye
usually offer case studies that claim sport to be an efficient medium of soft power in the
international  arena,  but  without  elaboration  through  relevant  supporting  examples.
Other authors have argued for a more strategic use of soft power, even urging its exercise
in  a  more  prescriptive  way  (Verschuuren  2013).  Nye  himself  argues  that  as  part  of
popular culture “sport can play a role in communicating values… National Basketball
games are broadcast to 750 million households in 212 countries and 42 languages. Major
League  Baseball  games  flow to  224  countries  in  11  languages.  The  National  Football
League’s Super Bowl attracted an estimated 800 million viewers in 2003. The number of
sport viewers rivals the 7.3 billion viewers worldwide who went to see America movies in
2002” (Nye 2004: 47). For Nye soft power is defined as “the ability to get what you want
through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of
a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies” (Nye 2004: x). However, use of the term
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soft power to denote the instrumentalization of sport in foreign policy evokes critical
questions around two main issues:
• The first relates to the actors that constitute the soft power of sport (i.e. the states, sports
federations, and athletes) and whether they share the same expectations. The preeminent
actors, the way in which they interact with one another, and their international role in sport
firstly requires determining.
• The second question concerns the relationship between national success and mega-events
and any subsequent benefits that could be achieved in terms of foreign policy, for example,
to what extent has the Super Bowl has had a positive impact on the image of the United
States?  Furthermore,  the  way  in  which  the  desirability  of  a  country  might  be  affected
requires consideration, that is, whether the concept of soft power offers a useful approach
to analyse, for example, the successes of the Beijing OG, 2008 or Sotchi OG, 2014.3 
5 The concept of soft power should be approached with a great degree of caution. As Jean
Leca has suggested it  is  an “uncertain concept” (Leca 2013)  due to its  polysemy and
concrete  uses,  since  soft  power  is  often only  considered as  an attribute  of  powerful
countries with the capacity to mobilize hard power. Undoubtedly, over that last decade
Turkey has tried to manoeuvre its  position to increase its  regional  influence,  largely
thanks to its economic growth and its relationship with the European Union (EU), despite
the ongoing ambiguities of the membership process. In particular, the government of the
Justice  and  Development  Party  (AKP)  has  endeavoured  to  develop  the  means  and
arguments  for  asserting  its  regional  power,  in  all  probability  feeding  a  collective
imaginary drawing on the nostalgia of the former power of the Ottoman Empire, albeit
the pursuit of a neo-Ottoman strategy is refuted by Ahmet Davutoğlu. Notwithstanding
the recent tumultuous developments, Turkey has played a significant part in the Middle
Eastern political scene over the last few years. Yet, how is its relative influence to be
evaluated? Can it  be asserted with certainty that Turkey’s  so-called positive regional
image has enhanced its interstate relationships to the extent that it has enabled decisions
to be made in its  favour? And if  so,  what were the desired images that  the Turkish
authorities intended to promote and what role have they played?
6 In this paper, I will make a distinction between the use of sport, more accurately football
matches, as a tool of diplomacy (in which the state remains the main actor of the process
in the context of bilateral relationships) and the use of sports events which includes also
the involvement of  sports actors for more diffuse ends.  Rather than referring to the
concept of soft power, the notion of sports diplomacy will be utilised in the first part to
analyse Turkey’s influence through the strategic use of sport:
Today sports diplomacy is associated with governments employing sports people to
amplify a diplomatic message, or with states using sporting events to enhance their
image among global publics, to cool tensions in flagging diplomatic relationships,
or  simply  to  test  the  ground  for  a  possible  policy  change.  Sports  diplomacy
transcends cultural differences and creates opportunities for alternate avenues for
overcoming  hostilities,  official  dialogue  and  people-to-people  relations,  uniting
separate  nations  through  a  love  of  sports.  More  specifically,  sports  diplomacy
involves representative and diplomatic activities undertaken by sports people on
the behalf of, and in conjunction with, their governments (Murray 2013: 12). 
7 Thus,  sports  diplomacy  may  be  understood  as  a  policy  implemented  by  political
authorities to rationally and strategically exploit football matches and its media coverage
in order to achieve its diplomatic goals. In the second part of the paper, mega-event bids,
and particularly the Istanbul OG bid, will be analysed as a more complex use of sports
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diplomacy.  Indeed,  the  political  uses  of  sports  exemplified  through  the  bid  process
reveals the degree of collusion that occurs between political, sport, and economic elites
for the promotion of state and individual interests. Specifically, through the comparative
analysis of successive bid proposals to host the Istanbul Games, the AKP’s strategy to
promote Turkey’s image will be critically appraised. 
8 The study is based on interviews, newspaper analysis, and personal observations that I
have carried out in Turkey throughout the last fifteen years. While reluctance to discuss
their activities has problematized the sociological analysis of interview data gathered
from diplomats  –  a  comparatively  less  restrictive  issue with sports  authorities  –  the
media has been crucial to the study, not only as a source of information, but primarily as
a raw material itself. Of particular relevance to the methodological approach undertaken
in this paper is the active involvement of the national media in the political strategy of
sports diplomacy, which has aimed to increase the prestige and recognition of the Nation.
Sporting events facilitate broad media and public consensus as a result of the support of
pro-government newspapers and because of the difficulties the opposition media face in
criticizing events,  which create a sense of pride and often feed off  a strong sense of
nationalism.4 Indeed, only in the wake of the Gezi events 5 in June 2013 did some rare
media commentary emerge welcoming the failure of Istanbul 2020. In a sense, rather than
focusing on sports diplomacy in policy-making per se, this paper critically examines the
significance  of  its  uses  and  implementation  through  the  provision  of  specific  case
examples.
 
I. The strategic use of sport: Sport as a tool of
diplomacy in interstate bilateral relations 
9 This section analyses the way in which sport as a diplomatic tool is conceptualised and
used by political authorities. As Norbert Elias (1994) has asserted, sport has the capacity
to euphemize the political competition and rivalry that exists between nations. However,
the  strategic  positioning  of  sport  to  resolve  political  problems  illustrates  its  more
expansive role than the euphemization described by Elias. By emphasizing the symbolic
signification  of  certain  matches  and  appealing  to  the  goodwill  of  the  populace  for
reconciliation through sport,  political authorities are able to display their capacity to
overcome a  political  impasse.  In  this  process,  the  state  is  the  main actor  and sport
becomes the tool for unlocking difficult situations, or at least functions as the means of
facilitating  bilateral  interstate  relationships.  The  most  famous  example  of  sports
diplomacy is  the Ping-Pong diplomacy between China and the United States in 1971,
which eventually led to the first official visit to the People’s Republic of China by an
American president (Xu 2008). This use of sports often occurs through matches between
two national teams within the framework of bilateral interstate relations.
10 In the last decade, Turkish authorities have utilized the opportunity offered by sporting
competitions  between  the  teams  of  countries  with  historically  difficult  relations  to
display its benevolence towards reconciliation. However, the question is raised as to the
intended ends  of  these  strategies.  There  are  multiple  possible  explanations:  national
security concerns over its borders,  a means of demonstrating its compliance with EU
membership  requirements,  or  alternatively,  an  act  made  by  a  regional  power
demonstrating  its  commitment  and  generosity  towards  populations  outside  of  its
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borders.  Participation  in  international  sports  matches  have  provided  opportune
occasions for the implementation of Turkey’s “zero-problem with neighbours policy”,
developed by the then Foreign Minister Davutoğlu. The way in which the government
appropriates these events will be outlined before the effectiveness of the strategic use of
sports diplomacy is assessed.
 
From Aleppo to Yerevan, the capacity to use sport as a diplomacy
tool: Scoring goals
11 Turkey’s  strategic  use  of  sport  as  a  tool  of  diplomacy was  observable  in  two recent
football events: The friendly Aleppo match between Fenerbahçe of Turkey and Al-Ittihad
of Syria in 2007; and secondly, the two football matches held between the Turkish and
Armenian national football teams in 2008 and 2009 respectively. The matches represented
an occasion for the demonstration of Turkey’s goodwill towards establishing relations
with its former enemies, a strategy that corresponded to its wider aim of strengthening
its role in the region.
 
Aleppo, April 2007
12 On the April 3, 2007, Prime Minister Erdoğan joined Syrian President Bashar-al-Assad in
Aleppo to watch a friendly match between Turkey’s Fenerbahçe and Syria’s Al-Ittihad to
mark the opening of the new stadium. According to Today’s Zaman (April 2, 2007), Erdoğan
convinced Fenerbahçe officials to hold the match after receiving a personal request from
Assad. Occurring during a period of comparative stability in Turkish-Syrian relations, the
match  provided  an  advantageous  occasion  to  publicly  demonstrate  the  progress  of
reconciliation that had been achieved by the two countries. Up until the 1990s, relations
had remained particularly tense, dominated by water disputes – Syria complained that
Turkey’s  massive  development  program in  the  border  region,  which  included  dams,
power plants and irrigation systems, diverted valuable water resources away from its
agricultural lands – and Syria’s support for Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the separatist
movement fighting for an autonomous Kurdish region in Turkey. Although escalating to
the brink of war, the arrest of the PKK leader Öcalan in 1998 following his expulsion from
Syria facilitated a diplomatic opening for a dramatic strategic realignment, including a
period  of  cooperation  between  the  county’s  new leaders  Recep  Tayyip  Erdoğan  and
Bashar  al-Assad  from 2002  to  2010.  Under  Turkey’s  new  “zero  problem policy  with
neighbours,” Erdoğan’s government sought to pursue investment opportunities in Syria
and secure assurances from Damascus regarding the PKK. For his part, Assad required
new allies in the context of renewed tension with the United States over Syria’s role in
Iraq and Lebanon. Meanwhile, Turkey was playing a mediatory role between Syria and
the international community concerning Syrian-Israeli relations. Regular visits between
both leaders were continued until the invitation was extended from Assad to Erdoğan for
the stadium opening. 
13 Despite difficulties in accessing direct information about the organization of the match, it
nevertheless  remains  important  to  bear  in  mind that  it  was  the direct  product  of  a
political decision in so far as the prospect of the two teams being drawn in a match
against each other were impossible given that they belonged to different regional football
federations; Turkey to UEFA and Syria to the Asian Football Confederation. According to
the mainstream Turkish media, the match was a friendly watched by 75,000 supporters
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inside the stadium and 150,000 outside in celebration of the two countries and its leaders
with slogans and flags.6 At a press conference held in anticipation of the Aleppo ally,
Erdoğan emphasized the strength of historical and cultural ties that existed between the
countries  and  reiterated  the  capacity  of  the  match  to  foster  relations  and  intensify
contact between their populations. He went on to welcome “the unbelievable friendship
wind blowing  from a  country  with  which  Turkey  had  been on  the  verge  of  a  war”
(Cemiloğlu  April  4,  2007).  Erdoğan was accompanied by his  wife  and the Minister  of
Energy and the Minister  for  Women and Family Affairs.  Ahead of  the game signs of
friendship were signalled as Assad pledged their mutual support of the opposing team. An
official meeting was held at the presidential palace in Aleppo to correspond with the
match and facilitate discussion about regional geopolitical issues – Iran and Lebanon, the
Israel-Palestine conflict, and energy trade – and the promotion of bilateral ties. Future
possibilities  for  cooperation  on  natural  gas,  water  and  energy  trade  were  explored,
including the planned construction of  a  joint  dam project  on Orontes  [Asi]  river:  “A
friendship dam.” (Çetin April 4, 2007) Therefore, it can be argued that the Aleppo match
offers a useful example of the instrumentalization of sport by political authorities for the
benefit of its leaders. The event and its media coverage were utilized as platforms for the
public affirmation of the political will behind the desire to overcome past tensions and
build  new forms  of  co-operation.  With  regard  to  Turkey,  the  visit  coincided  with  a
favourable  political  climate  towards  a  Syrian  rapprochement.  The  match  served  to
endorse Davutoğlu’s doctrine and strengthened Turkey’s regional image. Between 2008
and  2009,  after  Erdoğan  made  a  stance  against  Israel,  the  Turkish  Prime  Minister
continued to promote a positive image of Turkey in the Middle East, or at least until the
events of the Arab spring played out. In the Aleppo case, the political exploitation of the
match served to engender an image of peace. However, although these benefits were the
cumulative product of diplomatic overtures, the match failed to have a significant impact
on  Turkish-Syrian  relations.  On  the  contrary,  the  example  of  the  Turkish-Armenian
football matches discussed below is a very different case.
 
Turkey-Armenia football matches, 2008 and 2009
14 While points of comparison may be drawn with the Aleppo match, the example of Turkey
and Armenia offers  an alternative understanding of  the uses of  sports  diplomacy.  In
particular, three notable points of departure can be discerned: Firstly, the occurrence of
the Turkey-Armenia football matches were not of pre-determined by politics; secondly,
they  were  held  in  the  context  of  non-existent  official  diplomatic  relationships;  and
thirdly,  the  Armenian  issue  constituted  a  critical  political  issue  for  Turkey  at  both
domestic and international level.
15 An intervention of fate resulted in the drawing of Turkey and Armenia in the same group
for the qualifying rounds of  the 2010 FIFA World Cup (European zone),  the matches
scheduled to be played in Armenia, 2008, and Turkey, 2009. However, since Armenia’s
establishment as an independent state following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991,
the two states had no official diplomatic relationships. In addition, Turkey’s territorial
border  with  Armenia  had  been  unilaterally blocked  since  1993,  in  reaction  to
international pressure for the recognition of the Armenian genocide, and in expression of
Turkey’s  solidarity  with  Azerbaijan  over  the  Nagorno-Karabakh  issue,  Armenia’s
occupation of a fifth of Azerbaijan’s territory.  Although in all  likelihood the matches
would  have  continued  irrespective  of  the  diplomatic  situation,  Turkish-Armenian
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relations  entered  an  unprecedented  period  of  conciliation  from  2008.  According  to
Cheterian (2010: 39-40), four new elements contributed to the resumption of dialogue.
Firstly, in August 2008, the Turkish AKP government launched its “regional stability and
cooperation  platform  in  the  Caucasus”  as  an  instrument  of  its  new  foreign  policy
orientated towards its eastern borders. Ankara wanted to be perceived as a peacemaker
and subsequently sought opportunities to expand its influence in the East and South. The
objectives of the policy were inconsistent with the continued blockade of Armenia and
the refusal to establish diplomatic relations. Secondly, during his presidential campaign,
Barack  Obama  pledged  to  recognize  the  Armenian  genocide  and  the  new  American
administration  pressed  Ankara  to  normalize  its  relations  with  Armenia.  Thirdly,  the
desire to improve its problematized image in the wake of the Russo-Georgian war in
August  2008,  resulted  in  the favourable  modification  of  Russia’s  strategic  position
towards a Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. Finally, and by no means least, following
the election of Serzh Sargsyan, as Armenian President in February 2008, it was announced
that he wanted to initiate new relations with Turkey and establish an Armenian opening.
Actually this latter point might have constituted the decisive factor in triggering the
football diplomacy. Elected under the suspicion of committing fraud, Sargsyan had been
resolutely  criticised  by  western  governments,  the  EU,  and  non-governmental
organizations, such as Human Rights Watch, for the bloody repression that followed his
controversial election. According to Galstyan (2010: 246), the Armenian President had to
find an original means of legitimizing his presidency and credibility in the eyes of his
international critics. Within this context, initiating a process of conciliation with Turkey
and  creating  an  Armenian  opening  with  the  West  were  crucial  factors  in  the
consolidation  of  his  position  (and  besides  which  the  Turkish  issue  had  been  a  key
campaign point of his presidential rival). During a Moscow state visit on June 23, 2008,
Sargsyan  surprised  the  international  community  with  an  invitation  to  his  Turkish
counterpart, Abdullah Gül, to attend the Turkey-Armenia World Cup qualifying match in
Yerevan. The official invitation was delivered two weeks later via a Wall Street Journal
article: 
And just as the people of China and the United States shared enthusiasm for ping-
pong before their governments fully normalized relations, the people of Armenia
and Turkey are united in their love for football – which prompts me to extend the
following invitation.  On September 6,  a  World Cup qualifier  match between the
Armenian and Turkish national football teams will take place in Yerevan. I hereby
invite President Gül to visit Armenia to enjoy the match together with me in the
stadium. Thus, we will announce a new symbolic start in our relations. (Sargsyan
July 9, 2008)
16 The question of attendance provoked fierce debate in Turkey throughout the summer
among political actors, intellectuals, and “civil society” (Polo 2012a). The leaders of the
main political opposition parties, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist
Movement  Party  (MHP),  argued  that  this  so-called  invitation  should  be  declined.
However,  Erdoğan,  pro-government  newspapers,  and  liberal  intellectuals  broadly
supported  the  gesture,  with  some  even  urging  Gül  to  pay  a  visit  to  the  Genocide
Monument in the Armenian capital. At first, the Turkish president reserved his reply by
specifying that he would study with benevolence this invitation. While he had not given
his officially answer, Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan indicated on September 1st that Gül
would travel to Yerevan. Finally, on September 3rd Gül announced that he accepted the
invitation  of  President  Sargsyan  to  visit  Yerevan  and  to  attend  to  the  match.  In  a
statement,  Prime Minister  Erdoğan expressed his  satisfaction at  Gül’s  acceptance.  In
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underlining the potentially negative consequences of refusal, Erdoğan lends creditability
to the sports diplomacy dimension of the invitation: 
President Gül’s decision to accept or reject an invitation from Armenia will have a
considerable impact on the improvement or deterioration of Turkey’s image in the
international  arena.  If  he  had declined to  go  to  Yerevan,  everyone would  have
criticized Turkey for  refusing to improve its  ties  with Armenia.  If  Armenia had
ulterior motives when inviting Gül to the soccer game, then Gül spoiled their plan
by  accepting  the  invitation  […].  If  the  first  dimension  of  Gül’s  planned  visit  to
Armenia is to improve ties with this country, the second dimension is the Caucasus
platform. (Ünal September 6, 2008)
17 Thus, Gül, accompanied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, became the first ever Turkish
President  to  make  an  official  visit  in  Armenia  in  2008.  The  visit,  comprising  joint
meetings in addition to the match, took care to avoid any potentially contentious political
issues; the visit was to resolutely convey an image of mutual peace and cordial dialogue.
For example, although taking place during the holy month of Ramadan, President Gül
suspended his fast in honour of the pre-match meal offered by President Sargsyan. The
two Presidents exchanged signs of mutual friendship and benevolence. The pretext of the
game opened an unprecedented dialogue  in  daylight,  making almost  forget  that  the
contacts  had  never  been  completely  suspended.  Following  the  match,  the  symbolic
significance of Gül’s visit  was perpetuated by the media and politicians.  The political
import  of  the  event  totally  eclipsed  the  football  event,  including  the  national  win
achieved  by  the  Turkish  team.  Before  his  departure,  Gül  returned  the  invitation  to
President Sargsyan to attend the away match in Turkey in 2009.
18 Although  the  two  cases  presented  above  are  indicative  of  the  presence  of  sports
diplomacy in a manner reminiscent of Ping-Pong diplomacy, they in fact exemplify two
very different uses of sports diplomacy. In the case of the Aleppo match, the official
process of reconciliation had already been initiated prior to the meeting; the event was
therefore organized as a symbolic demonstration of this process as a tool of real power.
Conversely, and comparable to the situation that had existed between the United States
and China, Turkey had no diplomatic relationships with Armenia. The draw therefore
presented an opportunity for the dramatic reversal of this situation, offering a pretext for
the  initiation  of  an  official  process  of  reconciliation.  Here,  sport  operates  as  a
performative  diplomatic  tool  transcending  its  symbolic  value.  In  a  constructivist
perspective (Wendt, 1995), it contributes – or at the very least marks an attempt – to
redefine  the  mutual  interests  of  state  parties,  facilitating  new  opportunities  and
constraints in their bilateral relations. In the following section, the impact of diplomacy
on Turkey’s regional position and influence will be examined.
 
Football diplomacy challenged by realpolitik: Game over 
19 Assessing the impact  of  diplomatic strategies is  a  complex endeavour because of  the
different parameters of impact (domestic and international), the difficulties of measuring
the extent of impact, and the variable temporalities of impact in terms of its short and
long-term outcomes.  In  addition,  judging  sports  diplomacy  to  be  a  failure  would  be
misguided  since  instruments  of  traditional  diplomacy  may  prove  to  be  equally
unsuccessful.  A  final  point  for  consideration  is  the  evolving  nature  of  the  political
environment,  which  has  the  capacity  to  radically  alter  the  balance  of  international
relations in favourable or negative ways, particularly given recent events in the region.
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20 The prospect of Turkey taking advantage of its growing economic and political growth to
assert its position as a regional power remains not only contingent on the conduct of its
foreign policy, but on potential and emerging regional and international dynamics on
which it does not have any grip. Turkey’s remarkable reconciliation with Syria offers a
case  in  point.  While  the  freeze  in  bilateral  relations  experienced  a  period  of  thaw,
including the initiation of cooperative projects and the belief that Turkey could play an
intermediary role in the Israeli-Syrian conflict, the Arab revolts presented a profound
challenge  to  Davutoğlu’s  strategy.  The  Aleppo  match  represented  a  celebration  of
reconciliation as  a  mutually  self-serving  process  largely  conducted  in  pursuit  of  the
interests of its leaders. However, decline into civil war following the Syrian revolt in 2011
and Turkey’s ensuing support of the opposition, considerably altered relations. Yet, it
would be misguided to assume that this  unfolding of  events represented a failure of
sports diplomacy. Rather, the Aleppo match offers an understanding of sports diplomacy
reduced to its simplistic expression of an extension of friendship. 
21 Conversely, it could be argued that the matches between Turkey and Armenia had a real
diplomatic impact, at least in the short-term. The European Union and the United States
publicly supported Gül’s visit to Armenia (Today’s Zaman September 5, 2008). Olli Rehn,
the European Commissioner for Enlargement, warmly welcomed the visit, humorously
adding that if Turkey played in Yerevan as it had in Euro 2008, “it would cause a new
diplomatic incident.” (Hürriyet  Daily  News September 6,  2008;  Rehn October 13,  2008).
International acknowledgement of the visit was marked in other ways. The Monaco based
Peace and Sport organization distinguished Turkey and Armenia with the “Peace and
Sport Image of the Year Award” on December 4, 2008, for the photograph of the historic
handshake between Gül and Sargsyan taken at the Yerevan match as embodiment of the
image of fraternization through sport. The award was jointly presented to the Armenian
Minister of Youth and Sport and the President of the Turkish Football Federation.7 In the
following year, the FIFA Fair Play Award, 2008, was presented to the respective Football
Associations of Armenia and Turkey in recognition of their part in facilitating dialogue
between two countries with otherwise absent diplomatic relations (Fifa [2008]). 
22 Notwithstanding  the  historic  accomplishments  of  Yerevan,  the  most  momentous
outcomes were achieved in the political events that followed, without which the visit
would have remained a simple meeting of state representatives and limited to a basic
level  of  diplomatic  exchange.  What  assumes  significance  here,  therefore,  is  that  the
pretext of the match and the Gül’s trip to Yerevan allowed the Armenian President apply
diplomatic  pressure to  ensure on Turkey by conditioning his  presence at  the return
match  to  the  signing  of  two  diplomatic  protocols.  The  protocols  envisaged  the
establishment  of  diplomatic  relations  and  the  founding  of  an  intergovernmental
commission  to  address  the  political  issues  that  existed  between  the  two  countries,
including  the  institution  of  a  sub-commission  on history.  Of  course,  the  negotiation
process sparked a harsh backlash from the Armenian diaspora, the Armenian opposition,
Azerbaijan,  and  nationalist  circles  in  Turkey.  The  content  of  the  protocols  was
passionately  debated in both countries  and negotiators  had difficulty  in reaching an
acceptable  compromise  that  would  be  agreeable  to  both parties.  President  Sargsyan,
irritated by the slowness of the discussions, declared at the end of July 2009, “I will only
accept this invitation if previously made agreements are fulfilled, if there are real steps. I
will visit Turkey if we have reopened the borders and if we are on the verge of an end to
the blockade” (Hürriyet Daily News July 29, 2009). As for the visit of the Turkish President
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to Armenia the previous year, the presence of Armenian President for the return match
on 14 October 2009 became an issue for the two actors but in a different context: in 2009,
the symbol of the match (and the visit  of Sargsyan) must be preceded by diplomatic
agreements. Indeed, it could be argued that the symbol creates a diplomatic constraint.
However,  the  contested  content  of  the  protocols  created  political  fracture  lines  and
tensions continued to remain high in both countries and in Azerbaijan. The protocol was
finally signed in Zurich on October 10, 2009. The terms stipulated the opening of the
borders post-ratification and engagement in Zurich the protocol  which stipulates the
next  opening  of  the  borders  (once  the  protocol  ratified  by  both  parties)  and  the
implementation of “a dialogue on the historical dimension with the aim to restore mutual
confidence between the two nations, including an impartial scientific examination of the
historical  records  and  archives  to  define  existing  problems  and  formulate
recommendations”  (Protocol [October  10,  2009]).  Sargsyan attended the  return match
between Turkey and Armenia on October 14, 2009, alongside President Gül, who declared
that “Turkey and Armenia are not writing history but making history” (Kanlı October 14,
2009). Therefore, in a context of non-existent official diplomatic relations and where a
meeting  of  heads  of  state  was  highly  improbable,  the  matches  created  a  valuable
opportunity for staging a commitment to reconciliation at the highest level.
23 Seeking a definitive answer to the question of which signatory gained the most out of the
protocols is difficult to ascertain. Both states moved to secure their own interests: On the
one hand, Armenia, having initiated the process, obtained the promise of the opening of
the  border;  while  on the  other  hand,  Turkey  capitalized  on the  process  by  publicly
demonstrating, especially to the EU, its readiness to engage in a process of dialogue and
reconciliation. As France was holding the rotating presidency, French President Sarkozy
welcomed the protocols on behalf of the EU as “courageous and historic”, later praising
Turkish efforts to reach a peace deal between Israel and Syria at the Damascus summit.
However,  such  benevolent  rhetoric  did  little  to  indicate  a  fundamental  change  to
Sarkozy’s  oppositional  position  vis-à-vis  Turkey’s  EU  candidacy.  In  addition,  the
prospective long-term success of the reconciliation process remains uncertain due to the
failure to ratify the protocols and implement its terms,  including the opening of the
borders. In this regard, Azerbaijan has played a critical role as the real referee of the
match, its relations with Turkey pivotal to the progress of normalizing relations with
Armenia. As a result of its cultural ties and the issue of energy, Turkey has been ill able to
afford  alienating  its  key  strategic  partner  in  the  Caucasus.  Irritated  by the
rapprochement  between Turkey and Armenia, Azeri President Aliyev put pressure on his 
Turkish allies to mobilize Ankara into securing a resolution on the Armenian occupation
of Nagorno-Karabakh as the sine qua non condition of the ratification of the Turkish-
Armenian protocols.8
24 However, at the domestic level it can be argued that the real outcome of the match has
been  the  lifting  of  the  Armenian  taboo  in  Turkey  (Polo  2013).  Debates  concerning
relations with Armenia have intersected with other events, such as the murder of the
Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in 2007, which unleashed a powerful emotional
reaction,  and  discussions  addressing  historical  issues,  such  as  the  deportations  and
massacres of the Armenian populations in 1915, that have been increasingly engaged with
across a variety of academic, media, publishing, and civil society platforms. Of course, this
shift has not necessarily been translated into an official recognition of the 1915 genocide,
but it rather signals that the taboo of its dark history has been lifted (Insel and Marian
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2009). In 2014, for the first time in state history, a Turkish Prime Minister offered his
condolences for the 1915 Armenian massacre.
25 Thus,  sports diplomacy may appear to offer a means of endowing bilateral interstate
relationships with a more spectacular, publicised, and attractive dimension. At times, this
may also go further, as illustrated by the signing of the diplomatic protocols between
Turkey and Armenia. However, the real scope of these diplomatic strategies is dependent
on  both  the  political  context  and  realpolitik.  in  2007,  which  unleashed  a  powerful
emotional reaction, and discussions addressing historical issues, such as the deportations
and massacres of the Armenian populations in 1915, that have been increasingly engaged
with across a variety of academic, media, publishing, and civil society platforms. If sport
mega-events have the potential to fulfil a comparable role in diffusing beneficial images,
this is not totally the same process as they are not bilateral interstate relations.
 
II. Hosting sports mega-events as a means of
promoting a positive image abroad
26 In the last twenty years Turkey has dramatically increased both the number of sports
international events it has organised and the number of bids it has made to host sports
mega-events, such as the OG and the Football Euro. The impetus behind this process has
been initiated and predominantly driven by Turkish sports federations. Although due to
the large budgets, logistical support, and urban planning developments required to host a
mega-event,  very  little  can  be  achieved  without  strong  local  and  national  political
backing. In this regard, there is a continual degree of overlap between the political and
sporting spheres of activity. Although the sports field has its own agendas and interests,
which may fit (or not) with political ones, hosting a mega-event requires the collusive
collaboration of both sporting elites and political actors. What is of interest in the bid
process is the necessity of creating an imaginary around the candidate city (or country)
in  order  to  persuade  decision-makers.  This  refers  both  to  the  bid  content  and  the
technical specificities of each application, and also to the symbolic images candidates
wish  to  construct  and  communicate  to  an  international  audience.  Through  a
consideration of Turkey’s bids to host the Istanbul OG, it will be argued that the process
may be analysed as a branding strategy implemented through a communication policy. At
least between the 1990s and 2005, when the values of secular republican political elites
collided with those of sporting elites, the strategies aimed in part to claim belonging to
Europe. In an appraisal of the images promoted during the candidacy for the 2020 OG,
prepared under the auspices of the AKP government, the comparative continuities and
discontinuities of the bid process will be considered. The paper will ask whether the 2020
bid was  the product  of  foreign policy  changes,  and whether  its  use  of  other  images
marked an attempt to redefine its values. However, obtaining the OG or FIFA World Cup is
dependent on the capacity of an applicant city to attract and seduce decision-makers, i.e.
to secure the votes of the International Olympic Committee. In a sense, therefore, the bid
process already constitutes a tangible means of measuring the perceived attractiveness of
a country or, in other words, the so-called “soft power” of a country.
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International sports events in Turkey: A passport to Europe?
27 From the 1990s, hosting international sporting events has been a means of the Turkish
state,  founded  on  the  principles  of  “modernity,  secularism,  and  nationalism,”  to
demonstrate its modernity and organizational capabilities, and thus to legitimize its EU
candidacy. Prior to the 1980s, Turkey had only hosted wrestling competitions (in 1974
and  1977  respectively);  and  perhaps  unsurprisingly,  its  first  successful  bids  were  in
disciplines that are part of  Turkish traditional sports practices and in which Turkish
athletes have a proven track record of success in (wrestling, weightlifting).9 However,
from the 1990s, as bids became progressively more frequent, the increasing diversity of
sports bids can be observed: not only sports which have a tangible international and
media  impact,  and  in  which  Turkey  has  begun  to  have  some  success  in  (football,
basketball), but also in other disciplines (swimming, motor racing, archery, etc.). To date
the most prestigious applications submitted by the Turkish state has been its bids to host
the Summer Olympic Games.
28 From 1992,  Istanbul  has  repeatedly  bid  to  host  the  Olympic  Games,  though without
success; Turkey was perhaps unlucky not to have been awarded the co-organisation with
Greece for the UEFA Euro 2008 and Euro 2016 Football Championships. Not all bids have
been  unsuccessful:  In  2000,  Istanbul  hosted  the  thirty-fifth  European  Karate
Championships (EKF); in 2001, Turkey hosted the International Basketball Federation’s
(FIBA) European Basketball Championships; in 2005, Istanbul hosted the final of the UEFA
Champions League and the first Turkish Formula One Grand Prix; in 2010, it held the FIBA
World  Basketball  Championships  and  the  Judo  world  championships;  in  2011,  The
International University Sports Federation (FISU) held the Winter Universiade (World
Student Games) in Erzurum; between 2011 and 2013 Istanbul host the Women’s Tennis
Association Tennis (WTA) Tour Championships; in 2012, the International Association of
Athletics  Federations  (IAAF)  World  Indoor  Championships  in  Athletics  was  held  in
Istanbul  followed  by  the  Swimming  World  Championships  (FINA);  in  2013,  the
Mediterranean Games were held in Mersin;  and in 2014,  Turkey hosted the Women’s
Basketball World Championships. In addition, the European Capitals of Sport Association
(ACES) selected Istanbul as the European Capital of Sport in 2012.
29 Bids to host sports mega-events were initiated in the 1990s in the context of economic
growth and neo-liberalism alongside the emergence of powerful business groups with the
financial capacity to back these bids. In a sense these bids reflected the new economic
potential  and  power  of  Turkey  in  the  1990s. Turkey’s  numerous  bids  to  organize
international sports events may be regarded as a means of demonstrating the nation’s
modernity and its organizational capabilities, and thus the legitimacy of its application
for EU membership. This strategy was particularly apparent in the period prior to the
AKP’s assumption of power. Candidate for EU membership since 1987, Turkey continues
to claim its anchorage to the West, thereby pursuing the work of its founder, Mustafa
Kemal Atatürk. However, this western polarization is questioned both inside and outside
its  borders.  Although  Turkey  applied  to  the  EU  before  the  new  Eastern  European
members did,  negotiations for its membership were formally opened only in October
2005, and are set to continue for a while, given the strong reluctance of some member
states (including France and Germany) to admit Turkey to the EU. 
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30 International sports authorities, such as FIFA, UEFA and the IOC, define the application
criteria for candidate countries, including the quality of sports infrastructure, security,
communications  and  media,  financial  guarantees,  transport  system,  environmental
quality, and accommodation, etc. In addition to the more technical specifications, which
have a symbolic value insofar as they are an indicator of a country’s level of development,
applicant countries are required to specify the particularities of their candidacy assets.
For bidding cities,  this presents an opportunity to build a vision of a strong national
identity  in  the  image  of  the  Olympic  ideals.  In  this  regard,  the  focus  placed  on
multicultural  diversity  was  remarkable  given  the  controversy  surrounding  Turkey’s
human and minority rights issues as grounds for contesting its EU candidacy. The values
of tolerance and generosity have played a role in the imaginative construction of the
country’s image by the Istanbul Olympic Bid Committee (IOBC), the body with overall
responsibility for the city’s candidacy. All Istanbul application files have emphasised the
city’s unique geographical location. From its first Olympic bid to host the 2000 Olympic
Games  in  1994,  Istanbul’s  logo  depicted  two  interlinked  rings  with  the  slogan  “The
Meeting of the Continents” (although the logo was later changed for the 2020 OG bid). The
two rings invoked the stylised image of the Olympic rings to represent the continents of
Europe and Asia linked by the two Bosphorus bridges. Istanbul was thus presented as a
metaphorical “bridge between the cultures and civilizations of Asia and Europe. […] It is a
city of culture where religions and languages have merged over thousands of years of co-
existence”.  The bid book claimed that Istanbul  “is  home to 26 ethnic groups and its
people  speak ten different  languages.  The very existence of  “‘Olympist  Istanbul’  is  a
challenge  to  prejudice  and  sectarian  divide.”10 It  is  of  interest  to  note  that  these
statements made at the end of the 1990s, sharply diverged from the official state line
towards  multiculturalism,  national  belonging  being  firmly  situated  in  a  homogenous
conception of identity that failed to recognize ethnic minorities. By insisting on diversity
and pluralism, the authors of the Istanbul Olympic bid were striving to portray an image
of a peaceful and tolerant country.
31 Beyond its domestic audience, bids to host sports events also present an opportunity to
extend the image of peace to its regional neighbours. This was the goal of Turkey and
Greece’s  unsuccessful  joint  bid  in  2000 to  host  the  Euro 2008.  In  the  context  of  the
complex  and conflictual  (if  improving)  relationship  between Turkey  and Greece,  the
Turkey  initiated  bid  was  represented  as  the  inauguration  of  a  new  era  of  peaceful
cooperation and “greater mutual understanding”11 between the two countries. Following
the example set by the 2002 FIFA World Cup Finals between Japan and Korea, Şenes Erzik,
then FIFA executive  committee  member,  Korea-Japan World  Cup Finals  Organization
Committee member, and the Vice-President of UEFA , considered that the event “would
help to build a better relationship between Turks and Greeks.”12 The Turkish Football
Federation’s proposal to Greece in February 2000, was enthusiastically accepted by the
Greek Football Federation and supported by the foreign ministers of both states. In under
eighteen months,  a joint bid committee was instituted to prepare the official  bid for
submission to UEFA in November 2001. The change of parliamentary majority following
the first AKP victory in the general election, of November 2002, did little to change the
political momentum  behind  the  project.  On  the  contrary,  just  days  after  the  AKP’s
historic  victory,  Erdoğan delivered  a  speech to  UEFA members  to  coincide  with  the
selection day for the Euro 2008 host nation. However, it is interesting here to distinguish
the  political  support  to  host  Euro  2008  from  the  bilateral  diplomatic  use  of  sport
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described above.  Euro 2008 was initiated exclusively by sports elites and the Turkish
Football Federation who reasoned that they stood a better chance of securing the Euro
through a joint bid with Greece. Reconciliation with Greece was not viewed as a politically
invested endeavour, but was rather a means of lending a symbolic dimension to the bid.
Of course, politicians lent their support, however they did so while remaining largely in
the background. Despite some persisting diplomatic disputes with Greece over the status
of Cyprus and Aegean rivalry, the continuity of relations between Turkey and Greece has
never  been  seriously  interrupted.  Indeed,  Greece  even  supported  Turkey’s  EU
membership.  Turkish  sports  bids  thus  strive  to  promote  the  image  of  Turkey  as  a
European country on the verge of becoming an EU member: “At present, Istanbul is the
largest city in a country that is preparing for membership of the EU” (Bid document for
the 2008 Olympic Games). 
32 Finally,  hosting  an  international  sports  event,  or  the  victories  of  Turkish  teams  in
international events, are presented and celebrated as true national successes, and a step
closer to Europe: “Now, we are Europeans!” claimed Turkey’s former President, Suleyman
Demirel when Galatasaray won the UEFA Cup in 2000 (Sonntag June 9,  2000).  Indeed,
these victories are all the more so celebrated precisely because of their achievement on
the sports field. According to Ehrenberg (1991), the sports field is a condensation of the
democratic society ideal in which competition is equal and the winner is the best. In
other words, sport establishes a hierarchy based on merit rather than on human ranking
or  categorisation.  The  focus  of  Turkey’s  policy  is  based  on  the  understanding  that
through sporting successes the nation can achieve the European recognition it so desires,
even while the European political system continues to refuse it.
33 If sport is considered only as a means of diplomatic action, or as an instrument serving
political strategies or ideologies, then a full comprehension of the complex relationship
that exists between sport and politics in Turkey would be neglected. Of course, political
actors have to refer to sport:  Sport is  a valuable political  resource.  Sport can glorify
youth, – one of the most popular themes of the young Turkish Republic – and facilitate
patriotism in a country where May 19,  is  a national day for “sport and youth,” with
ceremonies organized in stadiums full of children, featuring poems and speeches made in
honour of the glory of young people, the Republic and Atatürk (Yurdsever 2003). The
political  authorities  in  Turkey  have  always  supported  bids  and  tried  to  profit  from
victories, whether they are derived from sporting victories achieved on the field or from
the victories won through hosting sports events. However, sport is not utilized by Turkey
in the same way and to the same extent as it was in the former Soviet Union or in China
for  example.  Even  if  the  relationship  between  sport  and  politics  is  a  particularly
entangled one in Turkey, it cannot be merely reduced to a politically exploitative one. 
34 Sporting  elites  are  closely  interrelated  with  the  political  elite,  sharing  the  same
republican values, at least prior to the AKP’s assumption of power, and possessing the
implicit knowledge that they can draw support from them. This phenomenon blurs the
lines between sport and politics in Turkey. Sporting elites acknowledge that they want
their teams to win competitions, but that they also want to see Turkey become a member
of the EU. Demirel’s exclamation following Galatasary’s UEFA Cup Final victory is not an
isolated example, but an assumption commonly shared by sporting and political elites:
“now, I hope you understand that we are Europeans!” claimed Sinan Erdem the president
of Turkish National Olympic Committee (TNOC) following a traditional Turkish dinner
(with fish and rakı) to IOC members during an official visit to Istanbul in 2000. 
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35 However, even if sporting elites believe that their sports project will prove advantageous
to Turkey’s application for EU membership, they are more often than not convinced to
the contrary that the opposite is likely: Barcelona and Athens hosted the Olympic Games
only after their acceptance into the EU (six years later for Spain, and 22 years later for
Greece). However, focusing on the country’s political image is a strategic way of realising
other specific goals,  such as the agenda of supporting sports development in Turkey.
Istanbul’s bidding efforts are also a means of building national sporting infrastructure, as
defined  by  the  IOBC,  the  General  Directorate  of  Youth  and  Sports,  and  the  Greater
Istanbul Municipality, as well as by private bodies. Through urban policy-making, Turkey
has been able to attain European standards in terms of its infrastructural development,
and  to  subsequently justify  expenditure  in  this  area.  Sporting  elites  also  aspire  to
promote sport among young people, not only from a health perspective, but with the aim
of producing a future generation of champions. Sporting elites consider themselves to be
the vanguard of sport, using sport to build the image of a modern Turkey in order to
procure vital support and financial investment from political elites for the proposal of
serious bids to host international sports competitions. Furthermore, the sports sector
draws important benefits from the support of political elites. An astonishing example of
the extensity of goodwill towards sport is manifest in the Turkish Olympic Law. Istanbul’s
Olympic  bid  is  endorsed  by  a  special  law,  near-unanimously  passed  by  the  national
parliament in April  1992,  making Turkey the first  (and so far  only)  country to have
enacted a legal instrument in its support. The Turkish Olympic Law (No. 3796) established
the Istanbul Olympic Games Preparation and Organisation Council (IOBC,) and authorised
it  to  “take  all  necessary  action  in  the  pursuit  and  organisation  of  the  Games”;  and
“recognises and respects  the supremacy of  the IOC in all  Olympic matters”.  The law
requires all public institutions and agencies, including local government bodies, to give
“priority to the requests of the IOBC in relation to the pursuit and organisation of the
Games”.  The Olympic Law guarantees a continuous flow of funds for the pursuit and
organisation of the Games. It is also of interest to note here that this law was devised and
prepared thanks to the strength of relationship between Sinan Erdem, president of the
TNOC, and Erdoğan Teziç, the famous lawyer, Chancellor of Galatasaray University, and
latter day president of the Council of Higher Education [Yükseköğretim Kurulu, YÖK]. Both
were  graduates  of  the  renowned Galatasaray  High School  [Galatasaray  Lisesi]  and the
Faculty of Law, Istanbul University. Sinan Erdem, who went on to become a professional
volleyball player and captain of the national team, coached Erdoğan Teziç during his time
at  Galatasaray.  Both  individuals  belong  to  the  Kemalist  elite  and  share  the  political
project  of  the  westernization  of  Turkey.  Beyond  the  pursuit  of  their  own  interests,
political and sport elites shared the same vision throughout this period: To be recognised
as Europeans and to strengthen the European identity of Turkey. It could be asserted that
the bid process constitutes a political claim for recognition and Turkey’s acceptance as an
equal by their Europeans counterparts.
 
Istanbul 2020 Olympic Games: A sports mega-event to celebrate the
“new Turkey”?
36 The Istanbul 2020 Olympic Games bid will be addressed through the analyses of the bid
book, published in January 2013, and the personal observations that were carried out
during  the  IOC  delegation’s  assessment  visit  to  Istanbul  in  March  2013.  It  will  be
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demonstrated that although the 2020 Istanbul bid retained the use of the majority of
images and symbols and was very much in line with previous bids, subtle changes can be
observed.  These  points  of  divergence  require  contextualizing  within  a  broader
perspective of the images that the government intended to promote over its decade in
power, claiming the rise of the news power of Turkey.
37 Followings its failed candidacy attempts to host the 2012 OG (awarded to London), the
TNOC took the pragmatic decision to postpone its next bid until the 2020 OG, based on the
rule of rotating continents every Olympiad and its assessed need to prepare a flawless
application.13 The Istanbul 2020 OG bid, the fifth consecutive bid to be made after the 2000
OG, was indeed the best presentation given to date due to the strength of its candidacy
assets. As a result of the Olympic Law, Istanbul has been equipped with modern sports
venues in accordance with IOC requirements. Since the last candidacy for the 2012 OG
presented in 2005, the TNOC underwent a series of significant changes. The former TNOC
President (1989-2003) and spiritual father of the Istanbul OG candidacies, Sinan Erdem,14
passed away in 2003. Erdem was the man responsible for initiating this (his) dream of the
Istanbul OG.15 His same generation successor left his post in 2011 to be replaced by the
President of the World Archery Federation, Uğur Erdener. During this period, Turkey
enjoyed a sustained period of economic growth and relative political stability with the
AKP continuing to retain its position of power following its successive electoral successes
from 2002.
38 In  November  2009,  the  head of  the International  Sports  Organisation of  the Turkish
Republic and senior consultant to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, announced that
Istanbul would bid for the 2020 OG. It was officially confirmed by Erdoğan himself in July
2011, during a speech presented before a cheering crowd of more than 20,000 to mark the
opening  of  the  European  Youth  Olympic  Festival.  An  initial  appraisal  of  Erdoğan’s
declarations and the Istanbul bid book results in the observation of comparable themes to
earlier  bids,  however,  closer attention reveals  an alternative tone.  For instance,  in a
jointly  signed  letter  by  the  Prime  Minister,  the  President  of  the Republic,  and  the
Minister of Youth and Sports, addressed to the IOC President in the introduction of the
Istanbul bid book, reiterates that Tukey is “a democratic and modern nation with its
ongoing European Union Candidature negotiations.”16 The location of the city is restated
as the point where the “East literally meets West [in our city], where Europe and Asia are
metropolitan  suburbs,  separated  only  by  the  spectacular  waters  of  the  Bosphorus.”
According to a journalist specializing in sports events, the Istanbul bid book does the best
to embrace 
…  the  jargonistic  and  portentous  lingua  franca  of  the  Olympic  Movement.  […]
Within a few pages of the first volume, it has seamlessly interwoven an array of
phrases and ideas that sum up why taking its flagship product to Istanbul is such a
tempting idea for the Olympic Movement. “The first-ever Games host in the Muslim
world;” Turkey’s Olympic law “in place now for 20 years;” the potential for sponsors in
“leveraging  a  spectacular  city;”  “Europe’s  youngest  population.”  All  are  phrases  just
crying  out  to  be  highlighted  in  fluorescent  marker  pen.  And  then  there  is  the
obvious point about the city being where Europe meets Asia (Owen January 13, 2013
).
39 Yet, what these ironic remarks fail to comprehend is the emphasis placed on the new
power of Turkey. The Istanbul 2020 bid book claims that “This bid holds a unique place
within the vision of the new Turkey and the region’s development.”17 This “new Turkey”
referred firstly to its economic growth: 
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Turkey has made great strides in all fields in recent years. Significant reform and
stability  have  strengthened  our  large  and  expanding  economy.  Our  record  of
economic growth continues in spite of the ongoing impacts of the global crises for
our region.18
40 Furthermore,  the  bid book develops  an argument  which aims to  prove the  financial
viability of the delivery of the Games: 
Driven  by  a  stable  democracy  and  economic  growth  averaging  5.2%  annually
between 2002 and 2011 (more than three and a half times Europe’s average for the
period),  the  visionary  2023  Master  Plan  for  Turkey  has  been  delivering
transformational development in Istanbul’s physical and social landscape for the
last  five years.  Already billions of  dollars have been invested in programmes to
deliver Istanbul’s new transport network for the twenty-first century, with further
major investment programmed to 2020. These and other development programmes
will  drive,  and  in  turn  be  accelerated  by,  the  Games.  The  city  has  become  a
multinational financial and enterprise hub. With its stock market growing by 26%
in 2012 and foreign direct investment in the city jumping 110% in 2011, Istanbul is
the financial capital of a Turkish economy forecast to be in the world’s top 10 by
2023 (ranked by GDP).19
41 The use of economic statistics not only evidences Turkey’s low-risk delivery strategy, but
also enables Turkey to play a broader role in the region: 
The  momentum  of  Istanbul’s  development  fuelled  by  Turkey’s  prosperity  and
youthful  populace,  offers  the  Olympic  and Paralympic  Movements  a  number  of
long-term strategic, commercial and operational benefits. The Olympic objective of
universality will be reinforced by embracing the Muslim culture, adding distinctive
value to the Olympic and Paralympic brands, as a new chapter in Games history is
opened.  Benefits  will  also arise  from Istanbul’s  status as  a  multinational  hub of
business,  sport  and culture for  markets  in Eastern Europe,  the Middle  East  and
Africa, enabling penetration into new and sustainable markets.20
42 Finally, the decision to change Istanbul’s logo, was unveiled by the Prime Minister in July
2012, may also be invoked as indicative of the shifting uses of images. In comparison to
the former logo, which underlined the geographical position of Istanbul, the new logo,
allegedly chosen by popular vote from a selection of five alternatives, combines a tulip
with the world-famous skyline of Istanbul to encompass its monuments and mosques. 
43 Hasan Arat, leader of Istanbul 2020, stated his belief that the new logo metaphorically
symbolizes what Istanbul is capable of offering the Olympic Movement: 
A vibrant  and young nation,  a  bridge  between Europe  and Asia,  a  modern and
spectacular setting steeped in history – these are the ideas we wanted the Istanbul
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2020 Candidate City logo to represent and our people have not let us down with
their vote. Our new logo has been chosen by Turkey’s young population to act as a
symbol of inspiration for our Olympic dream. (Gamesbids July 22, 2012) 
44 It is significant to recognise the performative role of the motif of the tulip as an evocative
reference to a symbol of the Ottoman period, and the annual International Tulip Festival
organized by the Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul.
45 Thus, the Istanbul 2020 Olympic Games has been represented by the political authorities
as a constitutive element of the momentum towards Turkey’s destiny, its grandeur, and
its renaissance as they “prepare to celebrate the centenary of the Republic in 2023.”21
During  the  IOC evaluation  visit  in March 2013, the  Istanbul  Olympic  Bid  Committee
invested a comparable level of confidence in its Istanbul bid thanks to its new role in the
region. From discussions with international journalists who followed the IOC’s delegation
visits to the three candidate cities, it became clear that some of them found the Turkish
presentation to be too austere and even a little bit arrogant. An impression was imparted
that the Turkish authorities were publicising a message that suggested any decision other
than a favourable result for Turkey would not only be an incomprehensible injustice, but
might even be received as a humiliation for the wider Muslim world.
46 It is important to bear in mind that Turkey invested substantial resources in its bid to
convince IOC members of its intended new regional and international role. Sporting elites
and political authorities have actively promoted Turkey broadly, and the Istanbul 2020
OG specifically through the numerous international trips that were undertaken between
2012 and 2013 (New York, Saint Petersburg, Dakar, Abidjan, Doha, Paris, Barcelona, etc.).
Turkey’s ability to develop an ambitious foreign policy and to extend the reach of its 
influence, particularly in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Africa, is largely a result of its
economic prosperity. In Africa, for example, Turkey has opened more than twenty new
embassies  since  2009,  and Turkish Airlines  currently  operates  services  to  28  African
countries.  Turkey has become a solid investor in the continent as well as a generous
donor for humanitarian crises. In 2013, Erdoğan visited several African countries, such as
Niger, Gabon, Senegal (in January), Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco (in June), accompanied by
businesspeople and journalists. Although primarily motivated by political and economic
concerns, the trips have also served to promote Turkey abroad. However, when a Turkish
delegation travelled to the Ivory Coast to attend the General Assembly of the Association
of National Olympic Committees of Africa (ANOCA) in July 2013, the aims of the visit were
far more transparent.  The Turkish delegation was led by the Istanbul Bid Committee
Chairman and the President  and Secretary General  of  the TNOC.  The delegates  were
accompanied by the former Ambassador  of  the  Turkish Republic  for  Cameroon (also
advisor to the Istanbul 2020 Bid Committee) and the Ambassador of the Turkish Republic
for the Ivory Coast. Speaking before travelling to Abidjan, the Istanbul Bid Committee
Chairman asserted with the intonation of a third world leader that: 
Istanbul  is  in  a  region  that  has  never  hosted  the  Games,  just  like  Africa.  We
understand the challenges of African sport – and we understand the huge ambition
of other nations that have not hosted the Games. In the city where the continents
meet, Istanbul 2020 will meet that ambition and help connect Africa with the full
power of  the Olympic  Movement… Istanbul  2020 is  committed to  providing the
most comprehensive support package for National Olympic Committees and their
teams. For the first time in Olympic history, every athlete from every nation will
have access to a free-to-use Olympic Training Precinct and Recovery Centre on the
same site as the Olympic Village. So in Istanbul, the sportsmen and women of Africa
will have a better chance of realising their full potential than ever before – perhaps
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the best chance they will have until the Games come to the continent. (Sportcal July
10, 2013)
47 This statement well illustrates the strategic use of Turkey’s new foreign policy in the
service of Istanbul 2020.
48 While it  is  commonly assumed that  the Olympics  are an instrument of  “soft  power”
(which has yet to be demonstrated), the question remains whether the impact of this new
Turkish foreign policy can be measured through its ability to promote and bring the
Games to Istanbul? The rapid analysis and interpretation of the awarding process for the
2020 Olympics may provide guidance as to the scope of this new foreign policy. In other
words, before we can regard the Olympics as an instrument of soft power, the question
firstly needs to be asked whether the award of the OG in itself is a tangible indicator of
this so-called soft power.
49 Evaluation of Istanbul’s 2020 candidacy, which had many points in its favour, was well
documented in the IOC delegation report, released in April 2013. Firstly, the IOC, ever
eager to embrace the “new world” in the image of Beijing 2008 and Rio 2016,  cast a
watchful eye over the candidacy of an applicant Muslim country, aware that very few
major sporting events had been held in the region.22 The IOC delegation stressed the 
quality of the application, an impression shared by other state observers, such as the UK
and Greece who announced their support for Istanbul 2020. Since its release ten years
ago,  the  internet  website  Games  BidIndex  has  become  the  “industry  standard”
measurement  of  the  competitiveness  of  OG  bids.23 For  example,  in  the  last  two  bid
campaigns, BidIndex correctly gauged the successful outcomes of Olympic host cities Rio
de Janeiro and Pyeongchang. In February 2013, Istanbul was ranked slightly ahead of
Tokyo in first  place:  Istanbul’s high score (61.78,  up 1.58 points)  was calculated on a
combination of over 100 fundamental evaluations carried out by BidIndex. Highlighted
among them was Turkey’s strong economic growth compared to its rivals and Istanbul’s
Olympic  bidding  experience  that  had  included  four  recent  campaigns.  Istanbul  also
demonstrated strong public support coming from a country and region that had “never
hosted an Olympic Games” (Gamesbids February 28, 2013). Thus, at the beginning of 2013,
Istanbul’s was tipped as the favourite nation to host the 2020 Games.
50 However,  the choice of  an Olympic city is  a combination of  factors outside the pure
rationality of the inherent quality of a candidate city’s application file. Beyond unofficial
rankings and official reports, it is ultimately the IOC members who vote according to
their  personal  convictions.  Obviously there are strong political  pressures,  the risk of
corruption exists, and until the last moment uncertainty remains a considerable factor.24
On September 7, 2013, in Buenos Aires, the CIO elected the city to host the 2020 OG. After
defeating Madrid to reach the final round, Istanbul lost the final ballot to Tokyo by 60
votes to 36. The results of the IOC vote is indicative of the persuasive power of Tokyo’s
proposal. Of course, it is very difficult to point out with any certainty the reasons behind
the  failure  of  the  Istanbul  bid,  and  it  will  not  be  attempted  here.  The  comparative
successes  and  failures  of  various  other  previous  bid  applications  have  shown the
demonstrative  need  for  candidate  cities  to  expand  their  sphere  of  influence  in  the
international arena and position their country in international sporting bodies, including
in the IOC. Despite the considerable mobilization of resources and the support of the
political  authorities and sports elites to launch an effective lobbying campaign – and
indeed despite being tipped as host favourites during the selection process – the Istanbul
bid resulted in a heavy loss during the final round. This failure may appear to constitute a
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genuine deficit of “soft power”; a failure of capacity to capably convince IOC members to
vote for Istanbul. The failure of successive Turkish bids to host sports mega-events often
evokes a bitter response from those involved in the projects (Polo 2012b). The failure of
Istanbul 2020 was received with great resentment, particularly as Erdoğan had been so
publicly engaged in supporting the bid. Never before had a Turkish Prime Minister been
so personally involved in fostering a bid for a sport event.25 Following the domestic and
international  turmoil  of  2013,  the  attribution  of  OG  to  Istanbul  would  have  been
celebrated as a personal victory for Erdoğan, evidence that under his leadership Turkey
had been successfully  guided into occupying a  new position on the world stage.  His
involvement in the biding process may explain why for the first time in its history the
Istanbul Olympic bid was no longer the consensus dream it had previously been (Polo,
2011).  The  urban projects  behind the  Olympic  bid  had already generated a  negative
backlash from the AKP’s hard-line critics in Turkey.26 In the wake of the Gezi events,
opponents  rallied  against  Erdoğan’s  authoritarianism.  Some  organizations  even
“requested the IOC to take Istanbul off of the list of cities for the 2020 Olympics in order
to  reclaim the  honour  of  Olympic  ideals.”27 Even  commentators  who  had  supported
Istanbul 2020 worried about the impact of the Games on Istanbul.28 When the results were
announced  during  the  ceremony  in  Buenos  Aires,  the  Turkish  delegation  remained
seated,  utterly  dejected.  Then,  Erdoğan  stood  up,  hugged  his  Japanese  counterpart
warmly and said, “We shall win [next time], God willing.” However, later, he told the
Turkish media that “it hasn’t been fair: In a way, they are cutting ties with the 1.5 billion
people of the Muslim world” (Today’s Zaman September 10, 2013). Erdoğan’s statement
conveys  the feeling of  Turkey’s  isolation and its  paradoxical  dilemma:  Not  European
enough to be accepted into Europe, and not enough powerful to be persuasive. He also
vehemently criticized the Turkish media and social networks, accusing them of ensuring
Istanbul lost its bid to host the 2020 Olympics.29
51 Unlike bilateral sports diplomacy, the impact of major sporting events are more diffuse
and uncertain.  If  the application process highlights the number of  symbolic values a
country is expected to embody, then its real impact is difficult to measure. In addition,
being awarded a sports mega-event like the Olympic Games implicitly means that the
country already has the strength and means of persuasion beyond traditional spheres of
influence. The first Olympic bids submitted by the TNOC were initiated by elites wholly
committed to the achievement of EU member status to consolidate Turkey’s European
identity, an ideal to which the Kemalist elites were so attached. Istanbul’s 2020 bid can be
considered to have occurred in a very different context. Turkey’s externally projected
image  changed as  the  result  of  intersecting  non-hierarchical  factors:  Firstly,  greater
economic prosperity provided the means for the development of a new foreign policy
that has sought to establish Turkey’s regional influence, including the former territories
of the Ottoman Empire and the Muslim world; and secondly, the difficult progress of EU
accession negotiations was exacerbated by the opposition of  some European member
states and Turkey’s slow pace of reforms towards the fulfilment of membership criteria.
The Olympic Games in Istanbul could have been a way of symbolically demonstrating to
Europe  Turkey’s  continued  movement towards  its  destiny,  regardless  of  the  lack  of
progress in the EU negotiation process.
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Conclusion
52 Over the last twenty years, the political use of sport in Turkey has been integrated into an
influence-building  diplomacy  to  foster  a  positive  image  abroad.  From  2000,  sports
diplomacy,  alongside  other  diplomatic  instruments,  have participated in  a  new AKP-
driven foreign policy, such as the international cooperation policy (instituted through
TIKA, the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency), and an external
cultural policy (implemented through the opening of Yunus Emre cultural centres in 28
countries).  At  home this  policy has sought to disseminate an image of  the nation in
multiple  ways:  As  a  benevolent  country  and regional  power  served by  an ambitious
foreign policy, as a country with a dynamic economy and a strong stable government, and
as a modern state sustained by its commitment to conservative values. In the aftermath
of the Arab revolts in the early 2010s, Turkey paraded itself, and was correspondingly
vaunted abroad, as a political model of the ideal modern state, which had succeeded in
successfully combining democracy with Islamic values. Particularly in the period after
2013, faced with a series of domestic and international setbacks the country’s weaknesses
were revealed through political developments that somewhat served to tarnish its image. 
53 This is probably the point at which the limits of public diplomacy and sports diplomacy
are reached. It is absolutely clear that states try to use sport for political purposes. Major
sporting events, particularly those that can be considered truly mega-events by virtue of
their exceptional  scale and global  impact,  namely the Olympics and FIFA World Cup,
receive absolute government backing. Nevertheless, it remains difficult to measure the
actual effects of sports diplomacy beyond the declarations made by political authorities
through communication policies and media coverage.
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22. The  choice  of  Qatar  to  host  the  FIFA  World  Cup  in  2022  has  been  the  subject  of  much
controversy, including amongst others, corruption charges and the bad working conditions of
workers who build the stadiums. The debate that has surrounded the decision is demonstrative
of  the  considerable  damage  that  can  be  done  to  the  image  of  a  country  awarded  the
responsibility  for  organizing  a  sports  mega-events,  that  is  to  say,  selection  does  not
systematically produce positive effects.
23. URL: http://www.gamesbids.com/eng/. 
24. The allocation of the 2012 Olympic Games to London over Paris would have been won at the
hotel and before the vote, thanks to the leading role played by then British Prime Minister, Tony
Blair, who put his political weight behind the campaign in the final straights.
25. Beyond making numerous trips abroad, Erdoğan flew from Ankara to Istanbul to host an IOC
delegation dinner at the historic Esma Sultan Mansion next to the Bosphorus in Ortaköy in an
effort to show his support for Istanbul’s bid and land the 2020 Olympic Games (Hürriyet Daily News
March 27, 2013). 
26. Former UN Special  Reporter  on the  Right  to  Adequate  Housing,  Miloon Kothari,  visiting
Istanbul in March 2013, invited by the Istanbul Chamber of architects [TMMOB Mimarlar Odası],
stated that the “Olympics would be a disaster for Istanbul” (İnce April 1, 2013).
27. The Urban Movements Istanbul,  Habitat International Network, and the Istanbul People’s
Houses wrote a letter addressed to IOC members denouncing the repression of the Gezi protests
and  the  Urban  projects  initiated  in  the  name  of  the  Olympic  Games,  see  URL:  http://
www.sendika9.org/2013/06/this-is-an-urgent-call-to-the-international-olympic-committee-ioc-
from-istanbul/. 
28. Thus, the secularist newspaper Cumhuriyet ran an article titled “Yes to the Olympics, no to
looting” [Olympiyata evet, yağmaya hayır], Cumhuriyet, August 9, 2013, p. 9.
29. See pro-government newspapers such as Star, Yeni Şafak, Akşam, Haber Türk in their editions
of September 9, 2013.
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ABSTRACTS
For the first time in its fifteen years of brilliant yet unsuccessful candidacies to host the Olympic
Games (OG) and the Football European Championships (Euro), Turkey was admitted into the elite
group of countries capable of staging sports mega-events. Although it failed in the last round for
the 2020 OG (beaten by Tokyo in 2013), and for the Euro 2016 (beaten by France in 2010), it has
since been tipped as the strong favourite to host Euro 2024. International matches have been
simultaneously utilized by the Turkish government as an opportunity to publicly demonstrate its
willingness to resolve historically problematic issues with other countries. In this paper, it will be
argued  that  Turkey’s  ambitions  to  host  sports  mega-events  and  its  politicization  of  specific
matches can be interpreted as a strategy of the state to diffuse a positive image at home and
abroad, and consolidate its role in the region. A distinction will  be made between the use of
sport, more accurately football matches, as a tool of diplomacy (in which the state remains the
main actor of the process in the context of bilateral relationships) and the use of sports events,
which includes also the involvement of sports actors for more diffuse ends. Rather than referring
to the concept of soft power, the notion of sport diplomacy will be utilised to analyse Turkey’s
influence through the strategic use of sport. Specifically, through the comparative analysis of
successive bid proposals to host the Istanbul Games, the AKP’s strategy to promote Turkey’s new
power will be critically appraised.
INDEX
Keywords: Sports diplomacy, sports mega-events, Olympic Games, Turkey, soft power
AUTHOR
JEAN-FRANÇOIS POLO
Institute of Political Studies of Rennes/Research Centre on Political Actions in Europe (CRAPE-
CNRS)
Seconded to Galatasaray University (Istanbul, Turkey) Department of Political Science and
International Relations
Researcher Associate at the French Institute of Anatolian Studies (IFEA, Istanbul)
jean-francois.polo@sciencespo-rennes.fr
jfpolo@hotmail.com
Turkish sports diplomacy in the service of renewed power? The uses and limits...
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 21 | 2015
27
